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Abstract
Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange
carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local
telecommunications network to any firm at “cost plus a reasonable profit” prices which
could combine them at will, add retailing services and sell local telecommunication
service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant in local telecommunications,
leased parts of Verizon’s network. Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer
of AT&T, sued Verizon alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against
AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The
Supreme Court held that Trinko’s complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that Verizon had two monopolies in
local telecommunications: a monopoly of the local telecommunications network, as well
as a monopoly in retail local telecommunications services. The 1996 Act allowed for
competition in retail services and also imposed cost-based pricing on leases of Verizon’s
network. Verizon, unable to increase the lease price on its network, reverted to raisingrivals-costs strategies against its retail competitors. Thus, Verizon used its monopoly of
the network infrastructure to disadvantage entrants in retail. In doing so, Verizon lost
short term profits that it would have earned from leasing its network to entrants, since the
1996 Act had set the lease price at cost plus “reasonable profit.” Thus, Verizon is liable
if the “sacrifice principle” is applied. According to the sacrifice principle, a defendant is
liable if its conduct “involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes
sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power.”
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I.

Introduction
The Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, a law partnership in Brooklyn, New York,

bought local telecommunications services from AT&T. AT&T was providing these
services by combining leased parts of the Verizon local telecommunications network
(unbundled network elements, or “UNEs”) and adding retail services of its own, such as
billing and marketing. In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko,1 Trinko sued Verizon for raising the costs of its retail rival AT&T (which had
entered the market as a competitive local exchange carrier, or “CLEC”) and otherwise
disadvantaging AT&T through anti-competitive conduct (including discrimination in
fulfilling customer transfer orders to entrants) under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
The district court dismissed all the claims brought in Trinko and accepted the
defendant’s view that a breach of the interconnection agreement between Verizon and a
CLEC should be remedied through an administrative process. The court also noted that
antitrust litigation would disrupt the regulatory process of implementing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”).3 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, stating that it was “unlikely that allowing antitrust suits would substantially
disrupt the regulatory proceedings mandated by the Telecommunications Act.”4 The
Second Circuit observed that
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540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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Id. at 402-05. Trinko originally sued NYNEX, which was later bought by Bell Atlantic. Bell Atlantic

merged with GTE to created Verizon.
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Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 113 (2d Cir. 2002).
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while ideally, the regulatory process alone would be enough to
bring competition to the local phone service markets, it is possible that
the antitrust laws will be needed to supplement the regulatory scheme,
especially with respect to injury caused to consumers.5
The decision of the Second Circuit to allow the antitrust claim to continue to trial
implies that Verizon’s failure to lease parts of its local network to rivals according to the
rules of the Telecommunications Act could result in monopolization once all the facts
were proven at trial.6 The Supreme Court, however, decided that Trinko failed to state a
claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint.7
The Supreme Court gave no weight to the key vertical issue in Trinko. Verizon
had two monopolies in local telecommunications: a monopoly of the local
telecommunications network infrastructure (NET), as well as a monopoly in retailing
services (retail). These two monopolies were vertically related. That is, to provide local
telecommunications services, a firm needed to combine the use of the local
telecommunications network infrastructure with retail services. Moreover, retail services
on their own had no value unless combined with the use of the local telecommunications
network infrastructure.
The 1996 Act allowed entrants to lease any part of the incumbent’s (Verizon’s)
local telecommunications network infrastructure at cost plus a reasonable profit. AT&T
and a number of other companies leased from Verizon parts of its local
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305 F. 3d at 112.
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305 F. 3d at 113.
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Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416.
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telecommunications network and became Verizon’s competitors in providing retail
services to customers like Trinko. Verizon leveraged its monopoly of local
telecommunications network infrastructure by raising the costs or decreasing the quality
of services of rival local telecommunications services providers so that such rivals were
disadvantaged. Verizon’s incentive to raise the costs of its retail rivals was to preserve its
monopoly in the retail part of local telecommunications services.
By raising the costs of retail rivals, Verizon lowered the number of leases of
unbundled network elements bought by retail rivals, and thus incurred a revenue sacrifice
because Verizon’s lease prices were guaranteed by regulation to be above cost. The fact
that Verizon incurred a short-term revenue sacrifice as a direct effect of its actions (in
raising the costs or decreasing the quality of services of rival local telecommunications
retailers) is an indication that the actions must have benefited Verizon in the long run by
foreclosing competition. Thus, it may be inferred that Verizon’s actions (resulting in
short term profits sacrifice) were anti-competitive.
The fundamental issue is when a multi-product monopolist has an obligation to
sell to companies a product or service that they may combine with products of their own
to sell as substitutes to other products that the monopolist sells. Thus, the crucial issue is
about compelling a monopolist to sell outputs that are used as inputs by rivals of the
monopolist in other markets.
A number of observations are in order. First, such a situation is not uncommon.
Multi-product monopolists are very common in many industries. Buyers are often
companies that combine the monopolist’s outputs and sell related products. Second, in
the absence of price discrimination or bundling considerations or competition with the
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monopolist in some other market, the monopolist would prefer to sell at a monopoly price
than not sell at all. Third, under the same conditions, the monopolist prefers to sell at a
price that exceeds unit cost rather than not sell at all. It follows that when a monopolist
refuses to sell, and therefore sacrifices short term profits, it must be guided by a long run
benefit that he would receive if through its actions competitors are foreclosed or
otherwise disadvantaged. These actions would be anti-competitive. Additionally,
strategies by the multi-product monopolist that raise rivals’ costs can have the same
effect on competition as a refusal to deal in the required input. A regulated multi-product
monopolist may have a greater incentive to resort to raising rivals’ costs strategies when
regulation prevents it from setting monopoly prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II puts the Trinko case in
the context of the continuing deregulation in the telecommunications sector. I discuss the
breakup of AT&T in 1981 and the wisdom of the imposition of line-of-business
restrictions on the local monopolists coming out of the old AT&T so that they would not
foreclose long distance competitors. Additionally, I discuss the major provisions of the
1996 Act, and how they apply to Trinko. In section III, discusses the Supreme Court’s
decision in Trinko and various problems that arise after close examination of the decision.
Section IV discusses the profit sacrifice principle and its application in Trinko. Section V
has concluding remarks.

II.

The Trinko Case in the Context of Telecommunications Deregulation
The Trinko case is better understood in the context of the evolution of

telecommunications markets in the United States. After a multi-year suit by the
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Department of Justice,8 AT&T agreed to be broken into eight pieces: AT&T itself, which
retained the long distance lines, the equipment division (Western Electric) and most of
Bell Laboratories, and seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (“RBOCs”) each of
which retained a monopoly in its region for local telecommunications services.9 The
logic of the 1981 AT&T breakup was that, given the technology at that time, competition
was economically feasible in long distance telecommunications services but uneconomic
in local telecommunications service. The local telecommunications network was
considered to have been too expensive to replicate compared to the revenues that it could
create, especially from residential and small business customers. Thus, assuming that
local telecommunications was a natural monopoly, the U.S. Department of Justice
allowed each RBOC to remain a monopolist in local telecommunications in its
geographic region.10
The Modification of Final Judgment (“MFJ”)11 that finalized the AT&T breakup
imposed line of business restrictions that prevented RBOCs from entering the long
distance market. This was because of the key vertical concern that is also the crucial
8

United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

9

The RBOCs were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, NYNEX, Pacific Bell, U.S. West, and

Southwestern Bell.
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The logic of the breakup and the belief that local telecommunications was a natural monopoly at the time

companies are based on private communication of the author with William Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust and chief architect of the settlement that resulted in the 1982 breakup of AT&T. See
also Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in
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issue in the Trinko case. Long distance calls require local access origination and local
access termination. These two services are under the control of a legal monopolist
RBOC in the period 1981-1996. If an RBOC is allowed to provide long distance service
as well, it can implement a vertical price squeeze against its pure long distance rivals, to
be discussed in detail below. As a result of the vertical price squeeze, the profits of a
pure long distance carrier can be diminished to the point that it is foreclosed from the
market. In other words, in 1981 it was understood that allowing RBOCs in long distance
would result in them leveraging their monopoly power from local markets into the long
distance market and that would foreclose long distance competitors and diminish
competition in long distance.12 To preserve and enhance competition in long distance,
12

As the MFJ notes, in the presence of line of business restrictions there will be no incentive and ability for

AT&T (or the RBOCs) to engage in the anticompetitive conduct alleged.
… [T]he ability of AT&T to engage in anticompetitive conduct stems largely from
its control of the local Operating Companies. Absent such control, AT&T will not
have the ability to disadvantage competitors in the interexchange and equipment
markets.
For example, with the divestiture of the Operating Companies AT&T will not be
able to discriminate against intercity competitors, either by subsidizing its own
intercity services with revenues from the monopoly local exchange services, or by
obstructing its competitors’ access to the local exchange network. The local
Operating Companies will not be providing interexchange services, and they will
therefore have no incentive to discriminate. Moreover, AT&T’s competitors will be
guaranteed access that is equal to that provided to AT&T, and intercity carriers
therefore will no longer be presented with the problems that confronted them in that
area.
Id. at 165.
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the MFJ imposed restrictions that prevented RBOCs from providing long distance
service.

A.

Vertical Price Squeeze and Raising Rivals’ Costs Leading to Foreclosure
To understand the usefulness of business line restrictions in preventing anti-

competitive behavior, consider a good that is comprised of two complementary parts AB,
and BC. Assume that both parts are necessary for the good to have value. Further
assume that AB is monopolized while BC is competitive. The example to have in mind
here for the 1981 AT&T breakup is AB being local originating access for a phone call
and BC being long distance transmission.13 We are going to compare two industry
structures. In the first industry structure with business restrictions, the monopolist of AB
is not allowed to be in the BC market. In the second industry structure without business
restrictions, the monopolist of AB is allowed in the BC market.
This was reaffirmed by the D.C. Circuit.
First. AT&T will no longer have the opportunity to provide discriminatory
interconnection to competitors. The Operating Companies will own the local
exchange facilities. Since these companies will not be providing interexchange
services, they will lack AT&T’s incentive to discriminate. Moreover, they will be
required to provide all interexchange carriers with exchange access that is “equal in
type, quality, and price to that provided to AT&T and its affiliates.” Proposed
Decree, Section II. See Part VIII infra.
Id. at 171-72.
13

A full analysis would require an additional service CD, also monopolized, which in the

telecommunications context would be termination access. Because AB and CD play the same role, it is
sufficient to analyze the model disregarding CD.
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When there are line of business restrictions, AB (originating access) is provided
by the local monopolist, and BC (long distance transmission) by the competitive long
distance sector. The price of the good ABC (the long distance call) is the sum of the
price of originating access and long distance transmission
PABC = PO.ACCESS + PLD.TRANSMISSION .
When there are no line of business restrictions on the local monopolist of AB, it
will also provide BC in competition with other long distance companies providing BC.
Now the local monopolist can control both the price of the composite good ABC, PABC,
as well as the price of AB (originating access), PO.ACCESS, when sold to its BC rival.
Thus, a pure long distance company that produces only BC would receive as revenue for
its long distance transmission
PABC - PO.ACCESS .
Thus, the AB monopolist can “squeeze” the revenue of a pure long distance carrier to a
very small amount. Setting any price PO.ACCESS above its cost would disadvantage the
long distance rival.14 Since the local monopolist charges itself its own cost for
originating access, when the final products are homogeneous, even a small deviation of
the price of originating access above its cost will result in foreclosure of an equally
efficient long distance rival. This is called a vertical price squeeze. The wisdom of the
line of business restrictions is that it avoids it.

14

Access fees have been typically set at very high prices compared to cost with the regulatory objective of

subsidizing basic service. See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in
THE LIMITS AND COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS (Richard Nelson ed., Russell Sage Foundation Press
2004).
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The previous example depended on the assumption that the AB monopolist could
set PO.ACCESS above cost. Perfect regulation would set this price at cost. Even then, in the
absence of line of business restrictions, the local monopolist can foreclose pure long
distance rivals if it can implement raising rivals’ costs strategies (such as delays and
quality decreases) against them. To show that, suppose that the local monopolist can
implement raising rivals’ costs strategies that increase the effective cost of access to
rivals to LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPRRCO.ACCESS above its costs for such services:15
LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPRRCO.ACCESS

> LOCAL.MONOPOLISTCO.ACCESS .

Assuming that a long distance company, say AT&T, has the same cost of long distance
transmission as the local monopolist (the two are equally efficient),
AT&TPLD.TRANSMISSION

= LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD.TRANSMISSION.

Then, faced with higher effective cost for access origination, equally efficient long
distance rivals will have to charge a higher price AT&TPABC for the final service than the
local monopolist’s price LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC and will therefore be foreclosed from the
long distance market, as seen below.
AT&TPABC

= LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPRRCO.ACCESS + AT&TPLD.TRANSMISSION =

LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPRRCO.ACCESS
LOCAL.MONOPOLISTCO.ACCESS

15

+ LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD.TRANSMISSION >

+ LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD.TRANSMISSION = LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC

Price when opponent Raises Rivals’ Costs (PRRC) represents the effective price of the monopolized

input to a downstream rival when the upstream monopolist uses a strategy that raises the costs of rivals or
reduces their quality.

LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPRRC O.ACCESS

is the effective cost of access origination faced by

long distance service rivals as a result of the local monopolist’s raising rivals’ costs actions.
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Therefore, when the local monopolist implements raising rivals’ costs strategies, AT&T
is forced to sell its long distance service above the price at which the vertically integrated
local monopolist sells it:
AT&TPABC

> LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC.

Thus, in the absence of line of business restrictions, even under perfect price regulation, a
local monopolist can implement raising rivals’ costs strategies, disadvantage and even
foreclose downstream rivals.
In summary, understanding that a vertical price squeeze and raising rivals’ costs
strategies can diminish competition in long distance, the government required in 1981
that RBOCs not be allowed to offer long distance service. In the abstract, in the absence
of line of business restrictions a monopolist that sells an input required by his
downstream competitors can diminish competition in a downstream market by using
price discrimination and raising rivals’ costs strategies. As we will see this applies
directly to Verizon’s the alleged behavior in Trinko.

B.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Implementation
The 1996 Act was a brave attempt to introduce competition in all

telecommunications markets.16 Congress understood that it was uneconomic for firms to
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See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in THE LIMITS AND

COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS (Richard Nelson ed., Russell Sage Foundation Press 2004) discussing the
1996 Act; Nicholas Economides, U.S. Telecommunications Today, in IS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (Carol
V. Brown & Heikki Topi eds., Auerbach Publications 2003) available at
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/US2002.pdf .
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enter in local telecommunications by replicating the infrastructure of the incumbents.17
Thus, it set up two additional possibilities for entrants (besides entering with their own
facilities): (i) to enter by leasing parts of the incumbents’ local telecommunications
network, known as unbundled network elements (“UNEs”)18 and (ii) to enter by buying
in wholesale the incumbents’ services and reselling them. The most important avenue to
entry was leasing all the UNEs (known as UNE-platform, or “UNE-P”), combining the
UNE-P with the entrant’s retail services (such as marketing and billing) and then selling

17

As the Federal Communications Commission stated:
Because an incumbent LEC currently serves virtually all subscribers in its local
serving area, an incumbent LEC has little economic incentive to assist new entrants
in their efforts to secure a greater share of that market. An incumbent LEC also has
the ability to act on its incentive to discourage entry and robust competition by not
interconnecting its network with the new entrant's network or by insisting on
supracompetitive prices or other unreasonable conditions for terminating calls from
the entrant's customers to the incumbent LEC's subscribers.
Congress addressed these problems in the 1996 Act by mandating that the most
significant economic impediments to efficient entry into the monopolized local
market must be removed. The incumbent LECs have economies of density,
connectivity, and scale; traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a natural
monopoly. As we pointed out in our NPRM, the local competition provisions of the
Act require that these economies be shared with entrants.

Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at ¶ 10-11 (August 1,
1996).
18

47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), (c)(6). The Federal Communications Commission defined the key UNEs as the

“local loop,” local switching, and local transport. See Federal Communications Commission, First Report
and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at § 51.319 (August 1, 1996).
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local service to final consumers. To facilitate entry, the 1996 Act set the price for UNEs
at “cost plus a reasonable profit.”19 The 1996 Act additionally mandated that unbundled
network elements be sold at “rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory.”20 To facilitate entry, the 1996 Act also imposed the requirement on
an incumbent to allow for physical collocation of equipment at its premises,21 and on all
companies the duty to provide number portability, so that consumers can keep their
phone numbers if they change local service provider.22
The FCC adopted the long-run forward-looking economic cost as the measure of
appropriate costs, or Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs (“TELRIC”).23
TELRIC is the sum of the costs for all economically efficient inputs required to supply

19

The 1996 Act at 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) orders that pricing of interconnection or unbundled network

elements:
(A)

shall be
(i)

based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or

other rate-based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element
(whichever is applicable), and
(ii)
(B)

nondiscriminatory, and

may include a reasonable profit.

20

47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).

21

47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
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47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).

23

See Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at Section VII

(August 1, 1996).

13

the UNE.24 TELRIC has the following features: (1) it is a forward-looking economic
cost; (2) it is the least cost to provide the service; (3) it is a long run cost; (4) it is an
incremental cost; (5) it includes a competitive return on capital; (6) it excludes monopoly
rents; (7) it excludes cross subsidies of any kind; and (8) in general, it reflects cost
differences among geographic regions.25
Prices based on TELRIC plus a reasonable profit, as mandated by the Act, for
leasing of UNEs are clearly above the present cost of the local telecommunications
network.26 The present cost of the local telecommunications network reflects the cost of
present-day resources that would be necessary to construct such a network.27 Thus, from
an economic point of view it is the appropriate cost measure, and it was correctly adopted
by the FCC.28 The incumbent local exchange carriers had argued that the appropriate
cost measure would be the historic or “embedded” cost of the network, that is, the

24

Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at Section F 51.505

(August 1, 1996).
25

Id.

26

See Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at Section VII

(August 1, 1996).
27

See id., at § F 51.505.

28

Id. The FCC did not calculate the cost of the most efficient current network. Instead it allowed for the

locations of switches and central offices of the incumbents to be fixed and calculated the cost of creating a
present-day network given these locations. Since these locations could also be optimized in the most
efficient network, the cost of the network as calculated by the FCC was in fact higher than that of the most
efficient network. Because it kept the old locations of switches and central offices fixed, the network
design approved by the FCC has been called a “scorched node” network design.
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historic cost of the network whenever it was constructed.29 However, the historic
construction cost of the network does not generally correspond to the cost of present day
resources to construct such a network.30 There could be many reasons for that, but I just
highlight two that show how inappropriate it would be to use historic costs, especially in
the case of local telecommunications.
First, technological change implies very significant cost reductions in the
provision of telecommunications services.31 For example, a key function in
telecommunications is switching and routing calls. Since the 1950s, this is done by
computers, where technological progress has been tremendous. To say that the
appropriate cost today of a present day PC is billions of dollars because producing a
computer with the corresponding computing power would cost that much in 1960 is
totally absurd. The incumbents’ proposal of using historic costs in the face of fast
technological change is equally absurd.
Second, telecommunications companies were regulated for a significant period
according to “rate of return regulation.” Under such regulation, the company was
guaranteed to recover its network infrastructure investments. The rate of return was set
by the regulator and the company adjusted its capital base and prices so that its profits
would not exceed the capital base times the rate of return. 32 An expansion of the capital
base by a dollar increased the allowed profits. Since this regulation guarantees recovery
29

See id.

30

Id.

31

See generally Economides, supra note 16.

32

See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.

ECON. REVIEW 1052, 1053-1069 (1962); Noll & Owen, supra note 10.
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of investment and allows for expansion of profits when the capital base is increased, it is
clear that regulated telecommunications companies had incentives to keep their capital
base high. Thus, the incumbent local exchange carriers have historically kept their capital
base high, and the key element of this capital base is the local network infrastructure.33
Therefore, even if historical costs were the appropriate measure of costs (which they are
not) the historical costs of the incumbents would have to be significantly adjusted
downward because of the distortions caused by the rate of return regulation.34
The 1996 Act also allowed entry of RBOCs in long distance, once they fulfilled
various requirements related to opening their local markets to competition.35 From the
point of view of an RBOC, long distance entry was supposed to be the reward for
allowing competition in the local exchange and losing its local exchange monopoly. The
1996 Act was based on the assumption that the individual private incentives of the
RBOCs would be sufficient to lead them to open local markets to competition. The 1996
Act did not impose penalties for delays in implementation or non-compliance. The lack
of penalties has proved to be a very serious deficiency of the Telecommunications Act.36
Congress thought that the “carrot” of entry in long distance would be sufficient reward
for RBOCs to open their local network. Recent history has shown that Congress erred in

33

AT&T long distance repeatedly adjusted its book value downward after competition developed in the

long distance market to eliminate the distortion caused by the rate of return regulation to the book value it
inherited. The RBOCs and GTE have not done so.
34

Moreover, it is likely that incumbent local exchange carriers have already recovered the original cost of

the vast majority of the physical plant that was in place by 1996.
35

47 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).

36

See generally Economides, supra note 16.
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this assumption. RBOCs’ behavior showed that they preferred not to open their local
network and pay the price of staying out of long distance for a while.
Implementation of the 1996 Act was very slow because of a variety of legal
challenges and long delays in the creation of electronic and other systems that would
allow large numbers of accounts to be moved across local telecommunications carriers in
a way that is similar to the practice in long distance. There were significant allegations of
various acts by incumbent monopolists to raise the costs of their rivals or lower their
quality. 37 These acts included disconnection for a few days of customers that were
switching telecommunications companies.
Besides litigation resulting from the implementation of the 1996 Act in nearly all
the states, the FCC rules were challenged by the RBOCs and GTE. The Supreme Court
invalidated the first set of FCC rules in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.38 The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated much of the second set of FCC rules in United
States Telecom Ass’n v. Federal Communications Commission.39 The FCC consolidated

37

See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pacific Bell, Cal. P.U.C. Case No. 96-12-026, 1997 WL

781839 (Cal. P.U.C. 1997); Cal. P.U.C. Decision 01-05-087 (May 24, 2001); and Caltech International
Telecom Corp. v. Pacific Bell, No. 97-2105 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing California Public Utilities
Commission investigation proceedings). The Trinko case itself was based on facts that emerged from an
earlier New York Public Service Commission investigation of violations by NYNEX (Verizon’s
predecessor) of its interconnection agreement with a CLEC, AT&T. NYNEX paid $10 million to AT&T
and other competitors for losses arising from violations of its interconnection agreement. See Trinko, 540
U.S. at 402-405.
38

525 U.S. 366 (1999).
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290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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the remand with its second triennial review of the rules implementing the Act.40
Subsequent litigation focused on the issue of “impairment,” as described in section
251(d)(2)(B) of the Act. Section 251(d)(2) reads:
(2)

In determining what network elements should be made available
for purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commission shall consider,
at a minimum, whether-(A)

access to such network elements as are proprietary in
nature is necessary; and

(B)

the failure to provide access to such network elements
would impair the ability of the telecommunications
carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks
to offer.41

After losing its first appeal, the FCC defined impairment as follows: an entrant
competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC) would “be impaired when lack of access to an
incumbent [local exchange carrier] network element poses a barrier or barriers to entry,
including operational and economic barriers, that are likely to make entry into a market
uneconomic.”42 In the appeal of the second triennial review of the FCC, referred to
generally as the USTA II decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s findings that

40

See Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Review of the

Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, FCC No. 03-36 (Feb. 20,
2003) (“TRO”).
41

47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (1996).

42

TRO, supra note 25, at ¶ 84.
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entrants would be impaired nationwide with respect to mass market switching.43 As a
result of this appeals decision and the FCC’s subsequent order on remand,44 RBOCs do
not have to set up new leases of the “local switching” UNE at prices that reflect cost plus
a reasonable profit.
As an immediate consequence of USTA II, in the summer of 2004, AT&T, the
largest long distance carrier, stopped marketing both local and long distance service to
residential customers. MCI acted similarly without a formal announcement. Since then
SBC has acquired AT&T and Verizon has acquired MCI. These mergers represent a
significant reduction in the number and capabilities of independent long distance
competitors, which may even result in price increases in long distance service.
On balance the 1996 Act failed in its main objectives. It failed to create
competition in local telecommunications. It also failed to guard against RBOCs
leveraging their monopoly power in the long distance market. As a result of the 1996
Act’s lack of guard against RBOCs leveraging their monopoly power in the long distance
market, the largest pure long distance companies were practically driven out of the
residential long distance market followed by acquisitions of AT&T and MCI by the
upstream monopolists.

43

See United States Telecom Ass’n v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 359 F.3d 554, 594-95 (D.C. Cir.

2004).
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Order on Remand, In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251

Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, FCC No. 04-290 (Dec. 15, 2004).
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III.

The Supreme Court Decision in Trinko
The Supreme Court’s Trinko decision had four parts. Part I described the

complaint and procedural history of the case.45 Part II considered “what effect (if any)
the 1996 Act has upon the application of traditional antitrust principles,”46 and concluded
that “the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust standards [but] does not
create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust standards.”47 Part III held that
“Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a
recognized antitrust claim under [the Supreme] Court’s existing refusal-to-deal
precedents.”48 Part IV considered whether to extend the Court’s existing refusal-to-deal
precedents to recognize a § 2 claim for failure to comply with the requirements of the
1996 Act, and concluded that such an extension is unwarranted given the existing
regulatory structure designed to enforce the requirements of the 1996 Act.49
The Supreme Court majority held and reasoned as follows. First, that the 1996
Act did not create a different environment than the customary one in the application of
antitrust law, despite the fact that the 1996 Act had an antitrust “savings clause.”50
Second, the Court held that antitrust law only rarely requires cooperation of a monopolist

45

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402-405.

46

Id. at 405.

47

Id. at 407.

48

Id. at 410.

49

Id. at 411-416.

50

Id. at 405-07.
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with rivals because (i) it can lead to collusion,51 (ii) it may retard innovation,52 and (iii) it
may reduce investment.53 Third, the Court noted a difference that it considered important
in comparing Trinko with Aspen Skiing,54 an important earlier Supreme Court decision on
refusal to deal. In contrast with Aspen Skiing, the monopolist in Trinko did not sell or
lease the product at issue (parts of the local telecommunications network) and then stop
selling it or begin discriminating against rivals. Instead, the market for leased parts of the
local telecommunications network in Trinko was created by regulatory fiat. The Court
noted that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”55 Fourth, the
Court declined to apply the “Essential Facilities” doctrine to the facts in Trinko
remarking that there was “no need to either recognize [the essential facilities doctrine] or
to repudiate it ... .”56 Finally, the Court stated that it did not want to get involved in
detailed regulatory matters.57

51

Id. at 408, “Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the

supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”
52

Id. at 407, implied by allowing monopoly power and monopoly prices to provide incentives to innovate:

“[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”
53

Id. at 414, “Judicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to distort investment and lead

to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop the variety of litigation routes already available to and
actively pursued by competitive LECs.”
54

472 U.S. 585 (1985).

55

Id. at 409.

56

Id. at 411.

57

Id. at 411-15.
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There are a number of aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision that are
problematic from an economist’s point of view. To start with, the Court is concerned that
negotiations between the contracting parties (Verizon and AT&T) would result in
collusion.58 This should be a general concern but has no application in this case because
here the contracting parties were in purely adversarial positions. Verizon was in
possession of a local telecommunications network and AT&T had no local network. This
is the antithesis of the situation faced by sellers of substitutes where the possibility of
collusion exists. Here the relationship was between a buyer and a seller. The FCC noted
Congress recognized that, because of the incumbent LEC’s incentives
and superior bargaining power, its negotiations with new entrants over
the terms of such agreements would be quite different from typical
commercial negotiations. As distinct from bilateral commercial
negotiation, the new entrant comes to the table with little or nothing
the incumbent LEC needs or wants.59
Negotiations and contracts between parties in these circumstances do not typically raise
antitrust concerns. Additionally, the parties had the obligation to negotiate imposed by
the 1996 Act, so the Court’s concern seems misguided.60

58

Id. at 408, (“Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of

antitrust: collusion.”).
59

See Federal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, FCC No. 96-325, at ¶ 15 (August 1,

1996).
60

Section 251(c) of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (1996) reads:
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The Trinko Court was also concerned that diminished investment in
telecommunications infrastructure would result from the leasing requirement imposed by
the 1996 Act. In principle, there should be no such concern from an antitrust point of
view. Often, reduced investment results in higher welfare. Market processes typically
help reduce redundant investment to the benefit of society. Moreover, the 1996 Act was
written with a clear understanding that replication of the local telecommunications
network was not only inefficient but prohibitively uneconomic. Thus, Congress created
in the 1996 Act a regulatory framework that allowed entry and increased competition
without necessarily any increase in investment in local telecommunications
infrastructure. In imposing on incumbent local exchange carriers leasing at cost plus a
reasonable profit, Congress decided against the replication of the local
telecommunications network because it would have been inefficient. Thus, Congress
explicitly chose regulatory rules that would tend to reduce investment in replicating the
existing network infrastructure.61

(c) ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS- In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each incumbent
local exchange carrier has the following duties:
(1) DUTY TO NEGOTIATE- The duty to negotiate in good faith in accordance with
section 252 the particular terms and conditions of agreements to fulfill the duties
described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b) and this subsection. The
requesting telecommunications carrier also has the duty to negotiate in good faith the
terms and conditions of such agreements.
61

Of course, the enhancement of competition in local telecommunications can lead to increased investment

in infrastructure complementary to local telecommunications.
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The Supreme Court noted that the markets for leasing parts of the local
telecommunications network were created by the 1996 Act and did not exist voluntarily
earlier. The Court somehow believed that Verizon’s refusal to deal and its related raising
rivals’ costs practices were somehow justified because infrastructure leasing prices were
based on cost plus a reasonable profit: “Verizon’s reluctance to interconnect at the costbased rate of compensation available under §251(c)(3) tells us nothing about dreams of
monopoly.”62 But Verizon was a monopolist in the network infrastructure and in the
network services markets.63 Reluctance to sell leases at above average cost prices is a
clear indication that the monopolist in the networks infrastructure market is attempting
through this action to prevent entry in the network services market which requires access
to the networks infrastructure market.
The fact that Verizon was obligated to lease local telecommunications
infrastructure at cost plus a reasonable profit and did not write such leases at any price
earlier does not imply that Verizon’s refusal to deal and raising rivals’ costs strategies
create antitrust liability. Markets are defined by demand for a service or a product. The
fact that the market for leasing local telecommunications infrastructure did not exist
before the 1996 Act is due to a number of reasons, and among them is the fact that
competitors likely believed that they would not be profitable if they leased assets at the
monopoly price. The fact that there was no demand at monopoly prices for such leases
does not imply that there was no demand at any price. Clearly there was significant

62

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.

63

See Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim & V. Brian Viard, Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local

Phone Service at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Local_Telecommunications.pdf .

24

demand at the “cost plus a reasonable profit” price, and most likely at prices above that.
Thus, the possibility of a market existed before the 1996 Act. Should we deem that
Verizon was justified not to sell or to raise rivals costs because it was denied the
monopoly price? There is no viable economic argument that a refusal to deal at abovecost prices should not raise serious antitrust concerns. The Court should have ruled that
Verizon’s refusal to sell (or raising downstream rivals’ costs resulting in lower sales) at
prices above average cost was anti-competitive.
The Supreme Court compared Trinko with Aspen Skiing. The facts in Aspen
Skiing were as follows: Aspen Skiing Co. controlled three out of four ski slopes in Aspen,
Colorado with the fourth slope controlled by Aspen Highlands. Aspen Skiing and Aspen
Highlands offered a joint ticket so that a buyer would be able to ski on all four slopes
with revenue shared according to use. Aspen Skiing discontinued the joint ticket in
1978-79 and refused to sell its tickets to Aspen Highlands even at full retail price, to
prevent Aspen Highlands from bundling them with its own tickets and recreating the joint
ticket that had formerly been available. The Supreme Court ruled that Aspen Skiing’s
refusal to deal was anti-competitive.64

64

Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 593-608. The Court noted:
[t]he refusal to accept the Adventure Pack coupons in exchange for daily tickets was
apparently motivated entirely by a decision to avoid providing any benefit to
Highlands even though accepting the coupons would have entailed no cost to [Aspen
Skiing Co.] itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and would have
satisfied its potential customers. Thus the evidence supports an inference that
[Aspen Skiing Co.] was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing
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The Trinko Court stated: “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2
liability.”65 Taking that as given, one would expect Trinko to fall within the outer
boundary set by Aspen Skiing. Because Verizon’s price was set by regulation at cost plus
a reasonable profit, it is reasonable to infer that Verizon’s price to cost margin was lower
than in the duopoly of Aspen Skiing. Thus, all else being equal, one would expect
Verizon more likely to refuse to sell than Aspen Skiing Co. From the point of view of
the firm committing the anti-competitive act, the incentive seems stronger for Verizon
than for Aspen Skiing. Therefore, if the Supreme Court deems the refusal to deal by a
duopolist in Aspen anti-competitive, it should find the refusal to deal by the monopolist in
Trinko even more so.
Being forced by regulation to sell below the monopoly price, and unable to
discriminate in price by regulatory restraints, the monopolist in Trinko has an incentive to
raise the costs of its rivals. If regulation were not present, price discrimination and
monopoly pricing would have likely made raising rivals’ costs strategies sub-optimal
form the monopolist’s point of view and they would not have been used. In the
regulatory environment of the 1996 Act, raising rivals’ costs is a natural response of a
monopolist to the restraints of regulation.66 Raising rivals’ costs strategies reduce

to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived
long-run impact on its smaller rival.
65

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.

66

See Nicholas Economides, The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist, 16 INT’L

JOURNAL INDUS. ORG. 271 (1998).
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competition and social welfare associated from the existence of a free market.67 In
applying an Aspen Skiing standard, the Court erred in not considering the significant
difference in incentives of the potentially liable party between the unregulated
environment in Aspen Skiing and the regulated environment of Trinko.
The Court stated that it did not want to get involved in regulatory matters, and that
is understandable. However, since the Court had already accepted that the savings clause
of the 1996 Act allowed for antitrust to be applied in parallel with sectoral regulation,
nothing would prevent the Court from declaring, for example, that Verizon’s degradation
of service to AT&T was anti-competitive, accepting the antitrust implications, and avoid
getting the courts involved in regulatory issues. There is a long tradition of courts
enforcement of the antitrust laws in telecommunications (as in United States v. AT&T68),
despite the fact that the sector has been regulated since the 1930s.
The Court missed the vertical leveraging issue in Trinko which I discuss below.
The discussion is an application of the vertical price squeeze and raising rivals’ costs
actions of a vertically integrated monopolist that were addressed earlier in the context of
competition in long distance and the need for line of business restrictions. The same
abstract framework applies. The only differences are the relevant markets and the names
of the players.

67

See generally Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Cost, 73 AM. ECON. REVIEW 267

(1983), and Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
68

See Modification of Final Judgment or MFJ, formally United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552

F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Verizon provides two local telecommunications services: (i) network
infrastructure services (NET services), which it provided to itself and to competitors in
local telecommunications; and (ii) retail services. End-users consume a composite
service comprised of NET services and retail services. Competitors to Verizon in retail
local telecommunications buy only NET services adding their own retailing services for
sale to end users.
When the 1996 Act was initially implemented, Verizon had a monopoly in both
NET services and retail services. The conduct of Verizon in Trinko can be seen as the
result of Verizon leveraging its monopoly in NET services to preserve its monopoly in
retail services. This was recognized by the Second Circuit, which noted that Trinko “may
have a monopoly leveraging claim” based on the fact that “the defendant ‘(1) possessed
monopoly power in one market; (2) used that power to gain a competitive advantage . . .
in another distinct market; and (3) caused injury by such anticompetitive conduct.’”69 In
contrast, the Supreme Court dismissed the vertical issue using a fallacious circular
argument in footnote four of its decision, stating, “In any event, leveraging presupposes
anticompetitive conduct, which in this case could only be the refusal-to-deal claim we
have rejected.”70 Here the key anti-competitive conduct was the leveraging from NET
services to retailing services, as I explain below, and the Court missed that.
Using the earlier terminology, AB (NET services) is the monopolized good, and
BC (retailing services) is the downstream good where there is competition after the 1996
Act. Only good ABC (local telecommunications services) is demanded by final

69
70

Trinko, 305 F.3d at 108.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 n. 4.
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consumers. All firms in retailing services, including Verizon, require to use NET
services to produce local telecommunications services. Profit maximization at the
corporate level at Verizon implies that NET services is sold within the company at cost,
VERIZONCNET.

Thus, Verizon’s price for local telecommunications to end users is
VERIZONPLOCAL

= VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAILING.

When Verizon sells NET services (leases its network), to rivals in the retailing services
market at an above-cost price, i.e.,
VERIZONPNET

> VERIZONCNET,

then an equally efficient competitor in retailing, say AT&T, would be forced out of
business since it would have to charge a higher price that Verizon to final customers for
local telecommunications service. To see this, assume that AT&T and Verizon are
equally efficient in providing retailing services, i.e.,
AT&TPRETAILING

= VERIZONPRETAILING.

Then the price that AT&T charges for local telecommunications services will be higher
than Verizon’s:
AT&TPLOCAL

= VERIZONPNET + AT&TPRETAILING =

VERIZONPNET
VERIZONCNET

+ VERIZONPRETAILING >

+ VERIZONPRETAILING = VERIZONPLOCAL.

Therefore, if AT&T leases UNEs (buys NET services) from Verizon above cost, AT&T
is forced to sell local telecommunications services above the price at which Verizon sells
them:
AT&TPLOCAL

> VERIZONPLOCAL.
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In this way, AT&T or any other rival in local telecommunications which has to lease
UNEs from Verizon can be foreclosed provided that Verizon can price UNEs above cost.
Alternatively, now assume that Verizon is forced by regulators to lease UNEs
(sell NET services) at cost. Verizon can use raising rivals’ costs strategies towards its
competitors in retailing services, such as delays and quality decreases, so that it increases
the effective cost of NET services to them to the level VERIZONPRRCNET, 71 which is above
its cost for such services:
VERIZONPRRCNET

> VERIZONCNET.

Then, using the same argument as in the AT&T 1981 divestiture, faced with higher
effective costs for NET services, equally efficient retailing competitors will have to
charge a higher price than Verizon’s VERIZONPLOCAL and will therefore be foreclosed from
retailing services. That is, a rival that is equally efficient with Verizon in retailing,
AT&TPRETAILING

= VERIZONPRETAILING,

will be forced to sell local telecommunications services at a higher price that Verizon:
AT&TPLOCAL

= VERIZONPRRCNET + AT&TPRETAILING =

VERIZONPRRCNET
VERIZONCNET

+ VERIZONPRETAILING >

+ VERIZONPRETAILING = VERIZONPLOCAL

It follows that, when Verizon implements raising rivals costs strategies, AT&T is forced
to sell local telecommunications services to final consumers above the price at which
Verizon sells them:
AT&TPLOCAL

71

VERIZONPRRCNET

> VERIZONPLOCAL.

is the effective cost of NET services faced by Verizon local service rivals as a result of

Verizon’s raising rivals’ costs actions.
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In summary, Verizon can use raising rivals’ costs strategies to leverage its monopoly in
NET services so that it forecloses its competitors in local telecommunications services.
Moreover, Verizon has an incentive to do so, since this strategy allows it to maintain its
profitable monopoly in local telecommunications services. Also note that the raising
rivals’ costs strategy can be used in addition to an increase in the price of NET services
and that these two strategies are not in conflict with each other from Verizon’s point of
view.

IV.

The Profit Sacrifice Principle and Its Application in Trinko
The Supreme Court did not state a rule under which specific conduct will be

found to be “willful monopolization.” In its brief in Trinko, the government proposed
such a standard based on the “sacrifice principle.”72 I define the sacrifice principle as
follows: a defendant is liable of anticompetitive behavior if its conduct “involves a
sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the
defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power.”73 This definition only partially
72

Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Trade Commission in support of Trinko, 540 U.S.

398 (2004) (No. 02-682) at 16.
73

As the Government’s brief notes, the sacrifice principle has been used in various versions in Aspen

Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608, 610-611 (conduct that “sacrifice[s] short-run benefits,” such as immediate income
and consumer goodwill, undertaken because it “reduc[es] competition over the long run”); General Indus.
Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1987) (conduct anticompetitive if “its
‘anticipated benefits were dependent upon its tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby
enhance the firm’s long term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power.’”); Stearns Airport Equip. Co.
v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 523-524 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (conduct exclusionary if it harms the monopolist
but is justified because it causes rivals more harm); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp.,
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coincides with the definition of the same principle in the Government’s brief in Trinko.
Specifically, the Government’s brief allows all behavior that does not involve sacrifice of
short term profits to be characterized as not “exclusionary” and not “predatory.”74 I
disagree. Conduct can be exclusionary even without a sacrifice of short term profits. But
when such a sacrifice is observed, it shows directly that this conduct being anticompetitive.
I am not endorsing the sacrifice principle as a single criterion to be used in
ascertaining anti-competitive behavior since there can be cases where there is no shortterm profits sacrifice but conduct does not make sense except to attain or retain monopoly
power. However, it is clear that if an action involves a sacrifice of short term profits that
cannot be justified except to the extent that it helps a company to create, protect or
enhance monopoly power, there is little doubt that such an action is anti-competitive.75

910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) (“making a short term sacrifice” that “harm[s] consumers and
competition” to further “exclusive, anti-competitive objectives”). Id.
74

“Conduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but

for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.” Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal
Trade Commission at 15, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004) (No. 02-682).
75

It should also be noted that changes in total welfare or total surplus realized from a market (the sum of

profits of all firms in the market plus consumers’ surplus, where consumers’ surplus represents the
difference between the total willingness to pay for a certain number of units by consumers and the amount
they actually pay) do not generally coincide with changes of profits of a dominant firm. Thus, a change in
profits by one firm, even a monopolist, does not, in general, correspond to a corresponding equal change in
welfare, or even a change in welfare in the same direction as the profit change.
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The vertical leveraging in Trinko passes the “sacrifice test.” The behavior of
Verizon to raise the costs of rivals in local telecommunications services entailed a
sacrifice of profits from potential leasing of UNEs. This sacrifice would not have
occurred if Verizon were not trying to protect its monopoly in the retail market for local
telecommunications services. Thus, in applying the sacrifice principle, Verizon’s actions
are found to be anti-competitive.
If Verizon did not have a retailing division, it would have no incentive to
foreclose or disadvantage independent retailing firms. Instead, if its strategy were not to
preserve its monopoly position in retailing, Verizon would have had every incentive to
sell its NET services to all at prices above cost, as mandated by the 1996 Act. Since
Verizon sells its NET services to its retailing division at cost while any NET services
price sold to third parties includes a reasonable profit (according to the 1996 Act’s rules),
raising rivals’ costs actions that disadvantage third party retailing service firms and result
in smaller sales of NET services to these firms clearly imposes a sacrifice of profits for
Verizon. Therefore, the “sacrifice” principle can be applied in the Trinko case in the
same way that the Supreme Court articulated it in Aspen Skiing to conclude that
Verizon’s raising rivals costs actions result in a short term sacrifice of profits and
therefore would not have been taken except to preserve its monopoly.

V.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s economic reasoning in the Trinko decision has a number of

defects from an economist’s point of view. The decision is likely to enhance and
preserve the monopoly of Verizon and the other RBOCs who remain near-monopolists in
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local telecommunications markets. The Supreme Court missed the leveraging of
monopoly power from the network infrastructure market to the retail telecommunications
market that Verizon engaged in to foreclose competition in the retail telecommunications
market. Additionally, the Supreme Court used the fact that the leasing market for parts of
the telecommunications network did not exist before being mandated by the 1996 Act to
find that Verizon did not have antitrust liability. This is problematic since technological
change can create new markets where none existed before, and the earlier non-existence
of markets should not be used as an escape from antitrust law.
The Supreme Court decided Trinko in the context of Aspen Skiing where
regulation was absent. However, the use of non-price strategies to raise rivals’ costs is
particularly important in Trinko because of the price regulation imposed by the 1996 Act.
Even in the context of Aspen Skiing, the Court erred in not allowing the logic of Aspen
Skiing to be applied to Trinko. The Court had applied the sacrifice principle in Aspen
Skiing, showing that Aspen Skiing’s actions had sacrificed short term profits. Here the
Court failed to apply the same principle, because it is clear that Verizon’s actions caused
it to lease less infrastructure at above-cost prices and therefore to incur a profits sacrifice.
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